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The Moscow merchant— 
He cheats with every stitch. 
What sort of native son is he? 
He’s just a son of a bitch. 
—19th-century doggerel,  
Buryshkin, Moskva kupecheskaia, 47. 
 
Trofimov (the intellectual) to Lopakhin (the 
merchant-entrepreneur): “you are rich, soon you’ll 
be a millionaire. And since, in the nature of 
things, we need birds of prey who devour 
everything in their path, you’re needed, too.” 
 —Chekhov, The Cherry Orchard, act 2. 
 
Trofimov: “We may never see each other again, so 
allow me to give you a piece of advice before we 
separate: stop waving your arms! . . . And another 
thing: this building of summer houses, and your 
plans for the summer people one day being turned 
into private owners—that adds up to the same thing 
as waving your arms about.” 
 —Chekhov, The Cherry Orchard, act 4. 
 
For Marx, capital is an abstract thing, faceless 
and therefore dead. Marx took a mollusk and studied 
the pattern on its shell, without asking why it is 
alive. 
 –Panikin, Private Wealth—National Vision, 46. 
 
How does an entrepreneur create a sense of legitimacy and belonging in a 
national culture in which state, private enterprise, and consumer are 
all deeply alienated from one another?1 Russia is a country with at 
least five centuries’ depth of suspicion with regard to free market and 
private enterprise. In 1471, when capital development was on its way in 
Europe, the free-trading, Hanseatic city of Novgorod was shut down by 
its more powerful neighbor Muscovy. Independent economic activity was 
                                                 
1 Here’s a late-Soviet anecdote about the ineptitude of state economic planning:   
In Lenin’s time (NEP, early 1920s) the government decided to allow small-scale private rabbit farming. In Stalin’s 
time (1930s) Stalin decided to kill the rich peasants and steal their rabbits. In Khrushchev’s time (1950s) the state 
pursued a policy of destroying the natural habitat of the wild rabbits and catching them all as they escaped. In 
Brezhnev’s time (1970s) the state decided to buy rabbits from the United States. In Gorbachev’s time (late 1980s) 
the bureaucrats created a new ministry to draw a picture of a rabbit and critique it. 
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increasingly bridled and controlled by the Muscovite state, which had a 
strong military as its first priority. Foreign traders were kept in a 
ghetto of Moscow known as the “German Quarter.” By the mid-seventeenth 
century the possibilities for native entrepreneurs, the merchants, had 
become strongly circumscribed. Their opportunities for travel were slim, 
they were limited to trading only in their local district, and they were 
much more heavily taxed than the landowning nobility.  As Russia started 
to modernize and westernize in the 18th century, this merchant caste as a 
whole stayed behind in a kind of medieval shadow, stuck in their local 
rituals of buying and selling (Rieber, 77).  Lucrative manufacturing and 
mining patents were handed to nobility willing to do the state’s 
bidding.   
Throughout the nineteenth century, well before the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917, capitalism was seen as something alien to Russian 
culture, something imported from Western Europe.  Large factories were 
concentrated in a handful of cities, and the rest of the country was 
agrarian and, except for the railroad, was almost completely lacking in 
economic and technological infrastructure. It functioned largely through 
a barter economy (Owen, 9).2  Despite the fact that Western European 
entrepreneurs settled in Russia and owned and operated some of Russia’s 
largest pre-revolutionary industries, they continued to live in their 
own “colonies,” typically not fully assimilating. 
 This situation fostered the commonly held view that Russia’s 
economic strength was in the land, not in the factory.  As the famous 
memoirist Pavel Buryshkin wrote in his book, Merchant Moscow:  “For an 
unbelievably long time Russians held to the opinion that their country 
was agrarian.  Manufacturing was superfluous, Russian industry would 
                                                 
2 One could observe a cashless economy at work even in the 1990s when manufacturers tried to pay wages 
in goods manufactured at their plant rather than in cash.  See: “The Cashless Economy,” The Economist, 
March 15, 1997, 77. 
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never be able to compete with Western European industry, and, finally, 
the factory and its whole way of life was corrupting people” (Buryshkin, 
38).  Not only were Russian entrepreneurs seen as being substandard by 
comparison with their western counterparts, but industrialization itself 
was viewed by the state and the educated elite as a morally corrosive 
force, something that Russia should avoid and leave to other countries. 
 On the whole, the pre-revolutionary Russian merchantry was indeed 
poorly educated, culturally backward, and politically benighted.  It 
earned the reputation of being deceptive and merciless.  Powerful 
writers focused on merchant life as the “realm of darkness,” embodying 
everything that was wrong with Russia.  Such Russian classics as 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace or Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov show 
merchants as speculators and cheaters, sometimes cruel and always 
dishonest and greedy.  The “good” entrepreneur is typically an 
uninteresting, even bland, foreigner.  In Goncharov’s novel, Oblomov, 
the honest, industrious businessperson is a russified German, a rather 
flat character, in contrast to the feckless, but much more fully drawn 
and emotionally appealing, Russian nobleman. 
The modern Russian industrial elite, when it emerged in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, could find no principle of solidarity 
and no unified voice.  It was fragmented along ethnic, geographical, and 
class lines.  There was no cohesion among ethnic groups, Jews, Poles, 
Azeris, Armenians, and Russians (Owen, in Clowes et al., 74-89).  Oil 
barons in Baku on the Caspian Sea had little to do with textile mill 
owners in the central, Moscow region, who in turn perceived little 
commonality with the arms makers up in St. Petersburg and the Baltic 
area. Industrialists from the traditional merchantry felt they shared 
few interests with gentry industrialists or with professionals of mixed 
social and ethnic background working in industry. 
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 During the Soviet era under Stalin private enterprise was 
eventually completely shut down and only reopened when widespread famine 
threatened the country, on the tiny scale of peasants selling fresh 
fruits and vegetables grown on their kitchen plots.  Capitalist 
entrepreneurs were depicted on Stalinist posters and in novels and 
movies as fat, luxury-loving, self-dealing crooks.  No wonder that, when 
Soviet industries were sold off excessively cheaply to private owners in 
the mid-1990s, among the biggest players sometimes did behave, and 
always were perceived to have behaved, according to this stereotype, 
with little interest in cooperating with and giving back to the larger 
society.3  On all too many occasions, capital has been siphoned off to 
offshore sites and thus not made available for the enrichment of Russia.  
Meanwhile, true grassroots entrepreneurship among people without 
Communist Party connections developed very slowly.  Small- and middle-
sized business, particularly manufacturing, was and continues to be 
weak. Both tax and legal infrastructures are still poorly developed and 
do not work to stimulate entrepreneurialism. 
The role of public attitudes to business and capital wealth should 
not be underestimated and may well have some bearing on the historical 
tendency of the Russian state to oppress native private initiative. The 
long-held public prejudice against wealth and resentment aimed at well-
to-do people shines through in such situations. Russian economic culture 
has been called a “culture of envy” (Smith, 200). American readers 
sometimes believe that Russians would jump at the chance for an 
American-style free market economy and economic individualism if only 
they were not so oppressed by their government.  Although they made use 
                                                 
3 During these years of the mid-1990s there was a whole industry making money around the “new Russian” 
entrepreneurs.  In the heart of Moscow, on the ancient Arbat, was a store called “The New Russians’ 
World,” with all sorts of over-priced knickknacks that made fun of the new entrepreneurs, e.g. dice, playing 
cards decorated with the emblems of the “good life,” a “new Russian” primer.  During my trip to Moscow 
this October I paid a visit, only to find that the sign was still there, but the store had closed.   
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of black market opportunities for better consumer goods, it is not true 
that the Soviet public as a whole was secretly for private enterprise.  
If they had been, it is unlikely that the Soviet system would have 
lasted in the same rigid form as long it did. Until recently, and even 
now in many places, the typical attitude toward wealth has been that, if 
someone has it, then they probably stole it. 
 In the mid-1990s, during privatization, the populace was generally 
suspicious of the notion of wealth.  In our pilot interviews of June, 
1996, one interviewee articulated the familiar idea that:  „Ordinary 
[Russian] people do not like rich people.“  This person went on to say 
that many people resented people who show initiative:  „the middle 
class. . . is alright with them. But if you go. . . into the countryside 
[you’ll find that] people do not always appreciate a person with 
initiative.“  And later in the conversation:  „if you and I were to go 
to some working collective, we would gather that if a person just rises 
up to a certain level, people start to dislike him.  Maybe it is envy, 
or maybe something else.  But people who achieve a lot are not well 
liked here“ (personal interview with CEO, Biznes Bank, June 4, 1996). 
After the collapse of the ruble in August, 1998, the situation 
changed in some ways for the better. Because of higher prices for 
foreign goods, Russians beyond the bounds of Moscow and other major 
cities started to support their own industry and to accept native 
entrepreneurship and personal wealth.  One 1999-2000 study of 1200 
interviews in the industrial Samara region of the Volga River (which is 
generally viewed as a relatively prosperous area) claimed optimistically 
that 50% of the population was adjusting well to the market economy. 
While many preferred a socialist economy for job security and equality 
(60.2%), almost 5% more liked the emphasis on personal self-reliance 
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that is characteristic of capitalism (65%).4 Similarly, while 30% of 
interviewees felt more comfortable with the “economic equality” of a 
socialist economy, a full 35% preferred the “permanent instability” of a 
market economy, and, amazingly, about 53% liked economic inequality.  
Most remarkably, a full 80% of those interviewed were attracted to a 
market economy by the possibility of “personal success.”  
 This study shows that attitudes toward personal wealth and poverty 
were changing. Interviewees were generally accepting of some personal 
wealth, though considerably more negative when asked about very great 
wealth and very great poverty. Interestingly, 48.7% of interviewees 
expressed a generally negative impression of the poor, while 34.3% 
expressed negativity toward the rich. 
 This brief review suggests that in some generally urban quarters 
attitudes to private enterprise and private wealth have changed.  A 
significant portion of the population in these places, it would seem, is 
buying into the idea that they, too, can become wealthier and that that 
might be a good thing.  In other words, we are witnessing a change in 
identity among these people.5 We return now to our original question: 
what have Russian entrepreneurs done to create a sense of legitimacy?  
We hear media-driven horror stories about the “take-the-money-and-run” 
approach to capitalism on the part of the super-rich oligarchs, such as 
the media and automobile mogul, Berezovsky, now in exile in London, or 
the oil baron, Khodorkovsky, now en route to a Siberian prison term. 
True stories of the super-rich pumping money out of the country abound. 
Of course, no one paid the very punishing federal, regional, and local 
                                                 
4 Oksana Vanina, REES talk, 04-19-01. I am grateful to Ms. Vanina, a sociologist from Samara, for sharing 
her research. 
5 As of August, 2000, with the election of Vladimir Putin many people felt that it was clear that, no matter what else 
he did, Putin would not undertake a Stalinist expropriation of property and business.  One reason cited: “the vast 
majority of the population has a positive attitude towards private ownership” (Aleksandr Tsipko, “Will Putin 
Confiscate the Oligarch’s Property,” Prism, 6:8 (August 31, 2000), 
http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=7&issue_id=436&article_id=3752, accessed 10-23-
05. 
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taxes, at least before the introduction of the 13% flat tax early in 
2001.  
Behind the scenes there are more local, smaller-capital 
entrepreneurs who have done their part to improve the lives of their 
employees and neighbors, to beautify their neighborhood, or to support 
cultural life.  Our few pilot interviews of 1996 turned up a number of 
examples of ways that entrepreneurs have “given back.”  The CEO of 
Biznes Bank told us that the bank had donated funds to restore the huge 
Sheremetiev museum in the Moscow region and subsidize the publication of 
art books, making them affordable for ordinary people. People over 50 in 
1991 were among the populations hardest hit by the end of the Soviet 
Union, and have been among the strongest supporters of the Communist 
Party.  In a smart move, the middle-level knit-clothing firm, Paninter, 
pays pensions to about 200 retirement-aged people living in the 
neighborhood of Moscow in which the firm is located (personal interview, 
June 10, 1996). The firm has vastly improved the look of its 
neighborhood, and, as it has expanded into other areas of enterprise, 
has improved the physical plant of those places, as well. Other 
interviewees were in the process of building capital, one through a 
boutique shop, one through gentrification of run-down central-Moscow 
neighborhoods. These people were so far in no position to be “giving 
back,” although the real estate developer was ethical: he made sure to 
find nice, single-family apartments in good working order for the people 
from whom he was buying communal apartments. 
 The CEO of Paninter, Aleksandr Panikin, did a great deal more 
publicity work to enhance the image of the private entrepreneur. In a 
way, his oversized public persona combined The Economist (or a Russian 
version of it), nineteenth-century Russian nationalists known as the 
Slavophiles, and Jimmy Carter—all in one person. Until his premature 
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death at 51 years of age in 2002, he appeared frequently on television 
and wrote on business and economic themes for the newspapers.  At his 
headquarters in Moscow he conducted regular seminars bringing government 
officials, businesspeople, and academics into the same room to discuss 
key issues. He renovated a country estate with the idea of founding a 
“colony” where artists, academics, and other intellectuals could 
congregate and discuss the burning questions of nation and world.  
While historiography attempts to chronicle and evaluate a 
plausible and reliable version of events as they happen, cultural 
studies focus, in part, on the “artifacts” that people create when they 
remember, rethink, and reenact historical events and figures. Cultural 
studies aim to understand myths (narratives of identity), archetypes 
(deep-structure human types, e.g. hero, villain/ rogue, leader, kinship 
types), rituals, and symbols that emerge in human cultures and the value 
systems and mentalities embedded in them. From this cultural-studies 
perspective Panikin presents a particularly interesting case of creating 
an archetype and a myth of the “good entrepreneur.” Not only did he act 
and make a direct impact in his relatively short life, but he left 
behind a rather rough, spotty, and perhaps not even completely truthful, 
autobiography. The autobiography was published in the literary journal, 
Novyi mir, in fall, 1997. (To my knowledge, it is, so far, the only such 
rags-to-riches story of its kind, unfortunately, because I am interested 
in collecting other such stories.) Here Panikin attempts, indeed, to 
project an appealing image of the private entrepreneur as a hero and to 
create a cultural script that addresses and overcomes the very negative 
Soviet-era narrative of the capitalist and presents a doable 
alternative.  His unstated goal is clearly to break new ground and make 
private enterprise and creating real wealth a socially acceptable way of 
life. 
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Panikin’s autobiography, which in my translation I have titled, Private 
Wealth—National Vision, may possibly be the first personal account of 
the inner workings of building a private enterprise in Russia.6 Growing 
up on the streets of the southern Russian city, Krasnodar, Panikin knew 
at an early age that he did not fit the mold of the “good” Soviet 
citizen.  He liked to invent ways to make money and to create networks 
to produce and sell needed consumer goods.  As a student at a theater 
institute in the 1970s he found legal loopholes in the centralized, 
state-owned economy that allowed him and his co-workers to manufacture 
decorative wall masks and sell them on the street.  From there, the 
logic of demand led him to change to production of other consumer goods—
earrings, toys, baby clothes—coming by 1990, just before the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, with his own barely-capitalized, multinational 
company, Paninter.  
 Panikin’s experience is striking in that he built his own capital 
base, working legally as much as possible, without having connections 
with the communist elite (the nomenklatura) but successfully using 
loopholes in the system to his own advantage.  He has built a business 
in the garment industry that faces stiff competition from Indian and 
Turkish competitors, and, before his death, the company more than held 
its own. There was even talk at some point of collaborating with Fruit 
of the Loom. Panikin writes his life to give proof that Russians can 
succeed and compete in manufacturing even without a strong capitalist 
tradition and faced with a bureaucratic and legal environment, which 
sees private enterprise as an opportunity to line bureaucrats’ and 
policemen’s pockets, and a negative popular opinion that, at least, at 
first hardly tolerated grassroots initiative.   
                                                 
6 There are memoirs and tracts from earlier eras.  See, for example, Pavel Buryshkin, Moskva kupecheskaia 
(NY: Chekhov, 1954) and I. A. Kirillov, Pravda staroi very (Moscow: 1916). 
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 Private Wealth—National Vision narrates a process of overcoming 
broad-based hostility to the notion of private wealth and property.  The 
Soviet State saw itself as the victor over capitalism and its social 
injustices.  Throughout the 74 years of Soviet rule instincts of private 
economic gain were supposed to have been eradicated through education 
and indoctrination—or, failing that, through imprisonment and even 
execution.  The new economic ideal was the selfless industrial shock 
worker, the udarnik, endowed with promethean energies, who put the state 
and the collective before personal gain.   
 The American media justifiably projects the impression that post-
Soviet capitalism is wild and chaotic, lacking a firm legal basis to 
defend the rights of ownership.7 The post-Soviet market economy is 
typically described as a situation in which a few men belonging the 
former Communist elite, the nomenklatura, are in control.  They have now 
changed their ideological stripes and are using their position to pump 
money and resources as fast as possible out of the country into foreign 
banks and companies.   
 Although the self-serving oligarchy and equally self-serving state 
are undeniably dominant in the economic picture of contemporary Russia, 
Panikin’s autobiography offers us the more hopeful view of a self-made 
man and his struggle for success.  Panikin paints a refreshingly 
concrete, if self-aggrandizing picture of a manufacturer who rose from 
the ranks of the urban poor to beat the Soviet bureaucracy at its own 
game. His story shows exactly how hard it was for an ordinary person 
without contacts in the all-powerful Communist Party to fight the status 
quo and to bypass tight restrictions on cash, real estate, and raw 
materials. Private Wealth—National Vision is a tribute to the boundless 
energy that it took to create an industry that eventually came in the 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Alessandra Stanley, “A Capitalist Democracy Marx Could Recognize,” New York Times, 
November 26, 1995, 4; Edward Luttwak, “What the Mafia’s Good For,” Washington Post, February 12, 1996, 23. 
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post-Soviet world to compete successfully in price and quality with 
imported goods. 
 Panikin’s story starts in the 1970s, a repressive time, when 
Leonid Brezhnev was Chair of the Communist Party and President of the 
Soviet Union. The economy was so bad that Brezhnev was importing grain 
from the United States.  Panikin grew up in a country with a so-called 
“command economy” (the opposite of a market economy).  In the Soviet 
Union every step of planning, distribution of materials, production of 
goods, and sales was controlled by a tiny elite in the Politburo and the 
Council of Ministers at the top of the gigantic Soviet economic pyramid.  
This command economy was characterized by state ownership, compulsory 
government employment, tight control of raw materials, and a scarcity of 
badly needed consumer goods.   
 At the foundation of the Soviet economic system was government 
ownership of all land and buildings. There were no private businesses. 
Although all businesses were owned by the state, even these state 
enterprises had to rent the buildings and land that they occupied.  No 
one could own real estate until 2001 or sell it until 2002.8   
 Everyone in the Soviet Union was compelled by law to have a job 
controlled in some way by the state and the party.  The Soviet state was 
like one giant firm with thousands of different arms.  Whether one was a 
teacher, a factory director, an actor, or a salesperson, one was always 
a state employee.   
There were two exceptions to this rule of state employment: 
peasants working on communal farms and artists.  An important loophole 
that allowed Panikin to start the process of building capital was the 
Soviet law permitting artists and artisans to obtain licenses to work 
for themselves as long as they did not employ other people.  As Panikin 
                                                 
8 http://www.rdiland.org/OURWORK/OurWork_FSU.html, accessed 10-23-05. 
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points out, this law was an extremely well kept secret, so well kept 
that hardly anybody knew about it.  Panikin used it to create what 
became a large cottage industry.  By the mid-1980s, he had over fifty 
people working “for themselves,” making various knick-knacks, toys, and 
clothing. Selling these products on the street was illegal, and this 
process became a constant cat-and-mouse game with the police. 
 While continuing to build his business, Panikin was careful to 
keep some sort of official job in the theater.  Despite the law on 
individual labor, a person was wise to hold some form of state 
employment on pain of being labeled a tuneyádets or a parasite, the 
punishment for which might be a term in prison.  In one way or another, 
the state could control each and every citizen through access to 
employment.   
 Panikin devotes considerable attention to the amounts of money 
that he accumulated.  The reason is to emphasize the increasingly high 
risk that he was taking.  Soviet financial policy was aimed at making 
money valueless and thereby curbing grassroots economic initiative.  
This way the state could deny the ordinary person the social mobility 
and opportunity to gather liquid wealth that money provides, and 
concentrate greater power and control in itself.  Because of this 
devaluation of money, the comfortable life—access to nice housing, good 
quality food, the chance to travel abroad depended in large part on 
one’s position in the state hierarchy.  Wellbeing depended on the 
ability to barter the perquisites of one’s job—be they theater tickets, 
travel opportunities, fresh produce, or an apartment—for what one 
needed. 
 Under the Soviet regime cash was used only at the end stage of the 
chain of production and distribution.  Raw materials were distributed 
according to the blueprint laid out in the five-year plan drawn up by 
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Gosplan, the State planning commission, working closely with the Council 
of Ministers and the Politburo.  Here no cash was transferred, and state 
companies used only clearing, non-cash accounts where no money changed 
hands, and accounts were kept on paper.  The same was true for the 
distribution of produced goods.  These would be picked up at the factory 
and delivered to a wholesale warehouse (optovaia baza).  From there the 
goods would be delivered to individual stores.  The cash collected from 
sales would then be delivered to the State Bank for eventual 
redistribution as wages according to the five-year plan.    
  Consumers used their pay (which they received in cash since there 
was no such things as checks) to purchase consumer items: food, clothes, 
medicine, and other necessities.  Whatever might be left over they could 
keep in a savings account at the State Savings Bank (Sberbank).  This 
was an institution unlike any Western bank.  It offered no interest on 
bank accounts and worked in close cooperation with the police.  It was 
almost impossible for an ordinary person to build up cash wealth.  In 
the 1980s the average monthly wages were approximately 200 rubles.  Some 
daily needs were covered through distribution of food of better-than-
average quality through one’s job.  An employee regularly received a 
portion of food, often of better quality and at lower prices, through 
the ordering department at his workplace (otdel zakazov).  More or less 
free vacations also were available through work.  Beyond that, since one 
had to pay for everything out of one’s salary—rent (low as it was), 
clothing, food, telephone—very little would end up in the savings bank.  
A typical bank account held about 1200 rubles.9  3000 rubles would be 
enough to buy a tiny car, the Zaporozhets.  Since government organs 
could and did monitor bank accounts, already a bank account of 5000 
rubles would attract attention.  With this kind of money one could buy a 
                                                 
9Thanks to Dr. Olga Kryshtanovskaia, a sociologist, specializing in the post-Soviet business elite, for this 
information. 
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Zhiguli, the Russian Fiat, which was considered by most people to be a 
luxury car.  This was the car that Panikin first owned while he was a 
student in the 1970s, and it raised a lot of eyebrows.  Most Soviets 
would already suspect a person with that much money of engaging in 
criminal activities, and that person would eventually come to the 
attention of the local party committee and the police.   
 If one had 10,000 rubles or more, as Panikin soon did, one could 
draw the attention of the dreaded OBKhSS (Otdel po bor’be s 
khishcheniiami sotsialisticheskoi sobstvennosti) or the Department for 
Fighting Theft of Socialist Property, or, more simply put, the Economic 
Crimes Division.  The purpose of this department was to curtail personal 
use of the country’s raw materials and finished products.  The 
punishment for being caught could be severe—release from one’s job, 
imprisonment, and even execution.  It is worth noting that as late as 
the Andropov regime in 1982 and 1983, the famous “token” entrepreneur, 
Yeliseyev, who ran a large delicatessen in the center of Moscow, was 
executed for alleged economic crimes.   
 To cut down on pilferage and theft—that is, the diversion of 
materials from the state to the private arena—raw materials were 
distributed to factories according to the five-year plan, but could only 
be legally purchased by ordinary citizens in a store where they would be 
available in very small amounts, if at all.  This very cumbersome 
system, as Panikin implies, led to difficulties for factory directors 
themselves.  Often materials, if they were delivered, were delivered in 
the wrong amount.  Directors had to use their ingenuity to obtain the 
necessary materials and produce the necessary quota of goods in the 
allotted amount of time.  In fact, quite a bit of trading of raw 
materials went on between factories, all of which had to be non-cash 
transfers or barter trade.   
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 The same held true for rejected products that were deemed to be of 
too poor quality to be sold in a store.  These would be taken to a 
recycling station where they would be destroyed or restored as usable 
raw material.  An ordinary person like Panikin might be able to get such 
materials only if they met two conditions—if they had an official 
document stating that the goods were needed at their place of work and 
if they could bring some materials of approximately the same weight to 
barter.  Thus, Panikin’s risk-taking behavior—for example, his 
warehousing tons of plaster of Paris (for decorative wall masks, and his 
quest for materials, even when they are only rejected nylon stockings 
(for making butterfly pins) or a bit of insulation (for baby shoes)—
takes on epic proportions.  If he had been caught with all this 
material, it would have been assumed that he had stolen it.   
It should be noted here that Panikin’s memoir is unique for the 
clarity with which he lays out the underground network of non-official 
trading routes that allowed the inflexible Soviet regime to function as 
long as it did.  In a sense, anyone who achieved anything of quality had 
to bend the rules more than a little. 
 The final point about the Soviet economy that can help us 
understand Panikin’s success in building up capital, and then in 
creating acceptance for it, is the overwhelming demand for consumer 
goods and services. Under the Soviet regime they were at the bottom of 
the list of state-planning priorities and thus rare and of poor quality.  
At the top of the list were military and other heavy-industrial 
interests.  In addition, Marxist-Leninist theory emphasized production 
rather than consumption, so that consumer services did not even count as 
part of the national economy.  Production of consumer goods, like almost 
everything in the centrally planned command economy, was a clumsy affair 
at best.  Central planning with its hierarchical structure was not 
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nearly as sensitive to consumer demand as a market economy is.  A market 
economy is motivated by orders from customers, while the Soviet 
centrally planned economy was motivated by numbers, that is, a high 
quantity of production.  In this centralized economy there was no 
principle of profitability.  On the contrary, price setting seemed at 
best a secondary consideration.  Prices in the Soviet era would be 
revised only once every decade or so and thus had no relation to real 
demand.  There was no device for measuring consumer demand except the 
oversized hierarchy linking ministers at the top, factory directors in 
the middle, and salespeople at the bottom.  Of greatest importance 
typically for the factory directors in the middle of the hierarchy was 
to meet the imposed quotas and thus to receive the rewards from on high 
that accrued to those who fulfilled the five-year plan.  For their part, 
the salespeople at street level knew all too well that they were working 
in a sellers’ market in which there was a continual deficit of desirable 
goods.  Often they would play that market for all it was worth, 
hoarding, speculating, and bartering their goods for other goods and 
services.  They became part of a large black market in which goods were 
sold at high prices much closer to their appropriate value in a deficit 
economy. 
 By the 1970s, when city people’s minimal needs were being met and 
they were accumulating some disposable income, there was ever increasing 
demand for interesting, fashionable, and well-made consumer products.  
Usually these goods came from such Soviet bloc countries as Hungary, 
Poland, or Czechoslovakia, and less frequently from the West.  Soon 
Russians like Panikin learned to make and sell similar items at much 
lower prices.  This demand gave Panikin with his cheap wall decorations, 
earrings, toys, and clothes a large and willing, if decidedly 
suspicious, clientele.   
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 When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March, 1985, the Soviet 
economy was already in shambles, and everyone in the planning and 
producing process knew it.  Although there was a great deal of 
discussion about renewing the economy, five years were lost in doing 
nothing.  Everyone talked, some promising laws were passed, but there 
were few concrete results.  The economic situation continued to 
deteriorate, and Gorbachev was caught in a contradiction.  Although he 
remained loyal to the Soviet command economic structure, he insisted 
that grassroots economic initiative must be loosened in order to 
revitalize the economy.  It was impossible to give rein to private 
initiative and still privilege the institutions of a centralized economy 
aimed at reining in private initiative.  One could not have one’s cake 
and eat it, too.  Gorbachev’s major push to loosen the command structure 
came in January 1988, when his Law on State Enterprises was passed.  
State enterprise directors were to be given greater independence from 
Gosplan and workers more of a voice in the administration of the firm.  
Neither stipulation helped since central control of access and 
distribution remained in tact. 
 The next step came in May 1988 with the law legalizing certain 
kinds of private business, called “cooperatives.”  Most of these were in 
the service sector, such as shops and restaurants, although a few, like 
Panikin’s cooperative Shuttle, manufactured goods, working on contract 
with factories.  The factories would provide materials, and the 
cooperatives would produce finished products.  This system, too, worked 
poorly, although many thousands of cooperatives came into being.  
Factory directors perceived the cooperatives to be direct competitors 
and tended to use their advantages, such as access to materials, 
capital, machinery, and space, to strangle the new producers.  Panikin’s 
answer was unusual.  He had capital on hand, which most people did not, 
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that permitted him to take control of the whole production process for 
knitting jersey cloth, dyeing it and producing finished clothes.  
Eventually he became fully independent of the state factories. In this 
move he was one of only a handful of new manufacturers.10
 Even in 1988, before the two laws of 1990 authorizing private 
ownership and the formation of any kind of corporation, Panikin won out 
and created a company, Paninter, of a significant size, which by the end 
of the century grew to about 2000 workers.  In 1990 Panikin was able to 
start what on paper looked like a multinational venture.  Just as the 
law on corporations passed late in 1990, he created a German arm of his 
company that then made it possible for him to purchase high-quality 
European knitting machinery and to import it. 
 What Gorbachev failed to do in the seven years of his presidency 
was to create a legal structure that would provide the stability 
necessary to support and encourage Russians as they ventured into 
private industrial production.  Soon after the failure of the 
cooperative movement and the fall of the Soviet Union in December, 1991, 
most would-be producers went under, conquered by the continuing 
resistance to private initiative on the part of the ministries and state 
enterprises.  Access to materials remained all but closed.  Many of 
those people became traders, selling whatever they were given to sell, 
or engaging in the import and export of goods.  It took a resolute 
person of enormous ingenuity, such as Panikin, to find his way through 
all the pitfalls and traps that drove most Russians away from production 
and back to trade. 
It should, of course, be noted that, despite state oppression and 
public suspicion of businesspeople and their wealth, Russia has seen a 
persistent stream of private enterprise.  Throughout the last decades of 
                                                 
10 For a good overview, see: http://kommersant.com/tree.asp?rubric=3&node=34&doc_id=290161, 
accessed 10-23-05. 
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the Soviet regime many consumers turned to the services of black 
marketeers out of desperation.  Nevertheless, these traders like their 
predecessors of the NEP period and of tsarist times had no legitimacy, 
much as loan sharks and the like do not in American culture.  They 
focused on quick wealth and rarely thought of the public good.  Panikin 
stands out against all these negative stereotypes of the self-serving 
nomenklatura, the street shysters, and the mafia.  At times, he takes on 
a somewhat didactic tone, teaching his reader what qualities the good 
entrepreneur should have.  One of his goals is indeed to forge a more 
positive image of Russian business, one that links private wealth with a 
national vision of the future. 
 In his autobiography Panikin has formed what could eventually 
become the basis for a new Russian “myth” of the good, ethical 
entrepreneur.  It should not be surprising that many countries with a 
successful history of capitalist development also have a culture hero 
who is an entrepreneur.  The Germans had Faust who was willing to take 
tremendous risk and who welcomed continual change in his life.  
Americans looked affectionately to Horatio Alger, the American icon of 
the man who made good.  The English had Robinson Crusoe, among others, 
who represented the positive power of economic individualism to amass 
wealth, improve nature, and raise the quality of human life.  In Private 
Wealth—National Vision, Panikin wants to project an image of an ethical 
self-made man. He starts by showing how, as a young boy, he was 
different from most of his fellow Soviets. Even while in school, he 
loved to make money. To start with, he was not concerned that he was 
actually stealing money: he made contraptions that would let him steal 
money out of public pay phones.  
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Panikin soon addresses the Soviet stereotype of the capitalist as 
a moneybags, who surrounds himself with luxury. As a student, after he 
had made his first 20,000 rubles, he lived the high life: 
I grew up in a family without much money . . . . and, to start 
with, my goal was to earn lots of money. Now I felt independent, 
I was the first student at my institute to buy a car. For several 
months I enjoyed throwing money around, I was young and lived to 
party. I had everything I could want. . . My naïve delight in the 
power of money did not last long. . . All those pleasures began 
to bore me, and I got depressed. (Panikin, Private Wealth, 13, 
with stylistic corrections).   
Panikin then “teaches” us that “money is a good servant but a poor 
master” and that money is an “illusory bastion of freedom” (13). In his 
image of the good entrepreneur, money is valuable “as a means for 
achieving goals.” One needs to “seek the real purpose for which he was 
created” (13).  
Panikin challenges the Soviet stereotype of the capitalist again, 
when talking about police searching his apartment when he was arrested 
in 1987:  
The detectives avidly searched my place. They parked their bus 
right at the entryway in order more easily to remove all the 
possessions that they were sure they would find. They were 
astonished to find nothing but the sparest furnishings— chairs 
with worn upholstery, an ancient wardrobe—less than modest. We 
slept on a second-hand sofa that we had covered with a child’s 
blanket—we just did not spend anything on ourselves. We had long 
since lost interest in the high life . . . . They riffled through 
all the corners of the apartment. . . . They expected to find 
gold and precious gems. Beyond our video player and our library 
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we had nothing. Not one ruble. (Panikin, 45, with stylistic 
corrections). 
Panikin argues that the police could not catch him because of their 
Soviet-era stereotype of the entrepreneur: “they had a one-dimensional 
view of the world. . . . They were sure that since I had cash, it would 
certainly burn holes in my pockets. According to their scenario, I 
should have bought furniture, antiques, and gold. They could not 
understand that I am drawn to higher, seemingly unreachable goals. I 
lived in a parallel world to theirs” (Panikin, 45, with stylistic 
corrections). Panikin concludes: “they drowned in their own stereotypes” 
(45). 
What is so Russian about Panikin’s image?  First, the careless 
bravado with which he does everything—he is, or was, clearly an 
irascible, impetuous, imperious man, who never took no for an answer, 
and whose life swung from crisis to crisis (Panikin, 58, 69). The tone 
of much of his autobiography has the hyperbolic tone of the Stalinist 
industrial epic, with the shock worker heroically completing his task 
against all odds.  We get a small taste from the following description 
of building stories on top of the building in which his workers were 
sewing clothes: 
The most impressive [work] was the construction of a four-story 
sewing factory at Lyusinovskaya 27.  The third and fourth floors 
were being built even as the garment workers made clothes on the 
first and second floors.  Everyone felt that something exciting 
was happening.  There was the same kind of enthusiasm that we all 
had seen when the Dnepr Hydroelectric Plant was being built a 
long time ago.11  You could not explain it, but people who came to 
work with us dropped the bad habit of drinking on the job 
                                                 
11The large hydroelectric dam was built in 1964 in Dneprodzerzhinsk. 
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(although they never did stop sitting in a circle under five-ton 
slabs of concrete that were being moved over their heads).  Soon 
three hundred square meters of floor space had become 1500 square 
meters (Panikin, Private Wealth, 63). 
In hyperbolic Marxist-Leninist historical terms, Panikin sees his 
enterprise leaping over whole eras of economic history. As of 1992, he 
claims that his joint-venture company Paninter was “just about the only 
business to have moved beyond cottage industry. . . . It was as if we 
had left one century, the century of handicrafts, and entered another, 
the century of industry” (Panikin, 66, with stylistic corrections). 
In his autobiography Panikin stresses his completely uncanonical 
religious belief.  In the West, as Max Weber famously showed us, 
capitalism and the authority to accumulate private capital came from a 
Protestant belief in personal predestination and in a personal, 
unmediated relationship with one’s God.  However, Panikin is most 
unusual for the Russian world, in which Russian Orthodoxy has 
traditionally preached poverty, passivity, and asceticism.  He is an odd 
sort of protestant, driven by a strong, inner sense of fate.  Although 
at times he seems very self-willed, he personally believes in fate—that 
he must play out the part that has been handed to him. He attributes his 
success in fighting the economic crimes police to staying to his 
preordained path: “The Most High safeguards those who follow their 
predestined path. Do not diverge, and everything will come out well” 
(Panikin, 44). This firm inner conviction helped Panikin to withstand 
and even prosper in one of the most coercive states in world history.   
It is of the greatest importance that Panikin’s voice in defense 
of private wealth appeared in the mainstream Russian press. Readers were 
exposed to the views of a businessperson who believed that there ought 
to be what Ann Cudd praised in her paper on contemporary American 
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capitalism in this seminar, some firm “rules of the game.” They could 
read about an entrepreneur who believed strongly in giving back to his 
community through philanthropy and through being a social leader. During 
his short life, Panikin helped to rejuvenate his small pieces of Russian 
turf and Russian society by creating his own entrepreneurial 
“microworld.”  
 
Beyond asking, as the original description of the “Capitalism and 
Culture” colloquium did, how the process of developing market-based 
economies has reshaped local or national cultural norms, we should also 
examine how non-western national traditions are remolding Western-
European/ US models of capitalist enterprise in their own image. What 
meaning do money, initiative, and private wealth hold in the Russian 
system of values and cultural identity? For example, American attitudes 
toward wealth have been characterized as “economic individualism”—which 
prioritizes personal wealth, gives a great deal of latitude to 
individuals in what they do with materials and land, and lessens the 
control of the government and various social collectives have over 
individual citizens.  In Russia, by contrast, the state and social 
collective have long overshadowed individual economic initiative, which 
strongly influences economic and other spheres of cultural activity. In 
archetypal terms, as we saw in the old-Moscow epigraph, the entrepreneur 
has often occupied the role of the “bad son,” who acts without the 
blessing of the parent (the state, the collective). In the post-Soviet 
era those deep cultural structures are still very much in place, though 
there is certainly greater acceptance of capitalist entrepreneurship. 
More than the controversial oligarchs, Panikin and other middle-level 
entrepreneurs have done a great deal to establish some small measure of 
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trust that has been lacking in Russian business culture for so long.12 By 
building economic “microworlds,” those oases of business that benefit 
ordinary people, neighbors, cultural life, as well as bring profit, 
Panikin hoped eventually to spread well-being to larger areas of Russia: 
As of 1997 we are probably the only live, developing light-
industry unit in Moscow and perhaps even in all Russia. As we 
develop, we pull others into our orbit. We place our orders with 
enterprises that have fallen on hard times and can offer work to 
people who have been going without for a long time. Only through 
enterprises that have adapted to the market and have proven their 
vitality can there be a rebirth of Russian industry. If the 
government and its policies support this process, then the 
chances become greater that Russia will emerge as a full partner 
in the global community. We must take this path if we want Russia 
to remain a player in today’s harsh world order (Panikin, 72). 
                                                 
12 Note Aleksandr Tsipko’s comment in: “Will Putin Confiscate the Oligarch’s Property,” Prism, 6:8 (August 31, 
2000), http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=7&issue_id=436&article_id=3752, accessed 
10-23-05: “The textile magnate Aleksandr Panikin, who manufactures cheap clothes and dairy products, is 
popular even among communists, among those who vote for Zyuganov.” 
  Clowes—25 
Bibliography 
Bill, Valentina T. The Forgotten Class. New York: Praeger, 1959. 
 
Blasi, Joseph R., Kroumova, Maya, and Kruse, Douglas.  Kremlin 
Capitalism:  Privatizing the Russian Economy.  Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Brady, Rose. Kapitalizm: Russia’s Struggle to Free its Economy. New 
Haven: Yale, 1999. 
 
Brovkin, Yuri. Hustling on Gorky Street.  New York:  Dial, 1975. 
 
Buryshkin, Pavel. Moskva kupecheskaia. New York: Chekhov Publishing 
House, 1954. 
 
Clowes, Edith, Samuel C. Kassow, and James L. West, eds. Between Tsar 
and People:  Educated Society and the Quest for a Public Identity in 
Late Imperial Russia. Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 
Gustafson, Thane. Capitalism Russian-Style. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Kornai, Janos. The Socialist System:  The Political Economy of 
Communism.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Lane, David, ed. Russia in Flux.  London:  Elgar, 1992. 
 
Owen, Thomas C. Russian Corporate Capitalism from Peter the Great to 
Perestroika.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 1995. 
 
Panikin, Aleksandr. Chelovek i gosudarstvo. Moscow: Paninter, 1999.  
 
Panikin, Aleksandr. Chto delat´. Moscow: Paninter, 1998.  
 
Panikin, Aleksandr S. Private Wealth—National Vision: The Memoirs of a 
New Russian Entrepreneur. Trans. E. W. Clowes. Stonybrook: Slavic 
Cultural Center Press, 2000. 
 
Panikin, Aleksandr. Shestoe dokazatel´stvo: priznaniia russkogo 
fabrikanta Moscow: Paninter, 1999. 
 
Rieber, Alfred J. Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. 
 
Ruckman, Jo Ann. The Moscow Business Elite. DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1985. 
 
Rutland, Peter.  The Myth of the Plan.  La Salle:  Open Court, 1985. 
 
Smith, Hedrick. The New Russians. New York: Avon, 1991. 
 
Wedel, Janine. Collision or Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid 
to Eastern Europe. New York: St. Martin’s, 1998. 
 
  Clowes—26 
West, James L. Merchant Moscow: Images of Russia's Vanished Bourgeoisie.  
Edited by James L. West and Yuri Petrov. With collaboration of E. 
Clowes and T. Owen.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1998. 
 
